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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines how local stock ownership influences the relationship between stock 
prices and future earnings. Prior finance literature has found that local investment leads to 
superior returns and has suggested that these returns are a result of an informational edge for 
those who invest locally. However, the literature has yet to examine which types of information 
local investors have access to and how that impacts the informativeness of stock prices. This 
paper shows that local investors have access to earnings-relevant information which results in 
stock prices which better lead future earnings for companies with larger local ownership bases. 
This phenomenon is more pronounced for companies headquartered away from institutional 
investors, where local investors are better able to drive the stock price. In addition, I find local 
investors have been more influential in pricing future earnings in local stocks in recent years as 
online and individual stock trading has allowed more local information to get priced. Overall, 
these results indicate that due to their physical closeness local investors are better able to 
anticipate future earnings than the investing public and can lead to more informative stock 
prices. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper investigates empirically how local investors are generating superior returns 
and if local trading results in stock prices which better reflect future earnings information. Over 
the past decade the accounting and finance literatures have found consistent evidence that 
investors prefer to allocate capital toward firms that are physically proximate to their locales. 
Originally observed at the national-level (French and Poterba, 1991), more recent papers have 
found evidence of this phenomenon within countries and states (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; 
Shive, 2012). In addition, while this local bias was first found in institutional trading patterns, it 
now appears to influence individual trading habits as well. (Huberman, 2001; Zhu, 2002; Ivkovic 
and Weisbenner, 2005). 
One of the most surprising findings of the local bias literature is that the portfolio shift 
toward local firms typically results in positive abnormal returns for investors (Coval and 
Moskowitz, 1999). The literature theorizes that these returns are a result of local investors’ 
superior information on nearby firms due to their first-hand understanding of the firm’s 
operations and financial future. Yet despite considerable research which supports this belief 
using local portfolio returns, there has been no empirical evidence examining the types of 
information which local investors are privy to and how that information influences the 
relationship between prices and earnings. This paper investigates empirically how local 
investors are generating superior returns and whether local investors are able to better align 
prices and earnings through their informed trading. 
 To test this hypothesis, I first identify firms where local ownership is expected to be highest. 
Following Hong, Kubik, and Stein’s (2008) proxy for local ownership, I calculate the total county-
wide dollars of personal income scaled by the market value of equity for all firms in the county. This 
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measure captures local ownership by examining the relationship between the supply of local 
investment dollars and the potential public investment avenues for those dollars. Investors, who 
are known to bias their portfolio toward local firms, can only invest locally in the firms which 
are situated near them. When there are few firms competing for local investment dollars, the 
available investments receive a greater portion of the available local investment dollars. 
Therefore, firms located in regions with a high supply of local investment dollars and low 
competition for those dollars are theorized, and have been shown empirically, to have higher 
local ownership. Using this measure, I examine whether the presence of local shareholders 
affects the extent to which prices lead earnings. As the quality of information on which investors 
are trading on increases, prices better reflect future cash flows as investors are better able to 
predict firm performance (Ayers and Freeman, 2003). Thus, if local investors have superior 
information regarding local firm performance, then a greater correlation should exist between 
prices today and future earnings streams for firms with high local ownership.  
 Using a sample of 42,342 firm-years from 1985-20111, I find evidence that local 
investors are better able to predict future earnings streams even after controlling for other 
potential explanations such as size, analyst coverage, and institutional ownership. This result 
indicates that much like institutional investors and short-sellers, investors who buy stock in local 
companies are trading on information sets which are superior to the general marketplace (Drake 
et al. 2014). In addition, for firms with high local ownership, stock prices are more informative 
and better incorporate information regarding future earnings. 
In further testing, I demonstrate that the connection between local investment and stock 
price informativeness is less pronounced for companies located near institutional investors.  In 
                                                          
1 The sample stops at 2011 because 3 years of future earnings and price information is needed in order to assess the 
relationship between current prices and future earnings. 
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cities with a large institutional presence, local individual investors are less capable of influencing 
the stock price since local institutional investors are privy to the same information set and have 
greater investing resources.  Therefore, in regions where institutional investors make up the 
greatest percentage of the local investment base, the level of institutional investment should have 
a greater influence on the relationship between prices and earnings than individual investors. 
Consistent with this belief, I demonstrate that companies located in New York City have more 
accurate prices when institutional ownership is higher, showing that institutions are also 
benefitting from their proximity to their investments and that it is the party with the greatest local 
capital which affects how prices relate to earnings. Additionally, I examine how the relationship 
between local ownership and the pricing of future earnings has changed over time. Individual 
investing has become significantly more commonplace in recent years as online and retail 
trading platforms have allowed for cheap individual trading in ways unavailable in prior decades 
(Choi et al, 2000). This has allowed for greater individual trading and better opportunities to take 
advantage of local trading knowledge. Results confirm that the effect of local investors on stock 
prices has been stronger in recent years, consistent with the notion that new trading platforms 
have allowed individual traders to better utilize their information advantage. Taken together, 
these results all support the belief that local investors are trading on better information than non-
locals and high local ownership results in stock prices which more accurately reflect future 
earnings. 
This study contributes to the accounting literature in two primary ways.  First, to my 
knowledge this is the first paper which empirically demonstrates that local shareholders are 
better predictors of future earnings.2  Despite the large finance literature which theorizes that 
                                                          
2 Malloy (2005) and Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2008) find that local analysts are better at predicting local firm earnings.  
This paper is distinct from their findings since analysts have substantial resources at their disposal which are not 
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local investors can generate higher abnormal returns because of improved information, little 
research empirically examines the nature and impact of the information sets which local 
investors are trading on. This paper helps researchers understand what kind of information locals 
possess that outside investors do not and provides evidence that this information is eventually 
revealed in future earnings. Second, this paper contributes to the literature discussing how prices 
lead earnings. The literature has generally established that prices better reflect future earnings 
when the information environment is richer (Jiambalvo et al, 2002; Ayers and Freeman, 2003). 
Yet there has been no literature which discusses how local investors, who are believed to be 
trading on a superior set of information, influence the relationship between prices and earnings. 
If local investors have access to a richer information set then their trades should influence how 
informative prices are regarding future firm performance.   
The rest of the paper continues as follows: In Section 2, I discuss the prior local bias and 
prices and earnings literatures and motivate my hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the variable 
construction, data sources, and research design. Section 4 provides the results of my empirical 
tests, Section 5 provides robustness and ancillary tests from the main hypothesis and Section 6 
offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Prior Literature and Research Questions 
2.1 Prior Literature 
2.1.1 Local Bias Literature  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
available to individual investors and because analysts do not trade on their information and therefore do impact 
stock prices.  A finding that local shareholders are able to predict future earnings would offer direct evidence 
regarding what drives local returns and show that superior local information can be obtained independent of the 
resources available to major institutions. 
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Local bias is the phenomenon that both individual traders and institutions prefer to invest 
in companies which are physically proximate to them.  French and Poterba (1991) first noticed 
this behavior when documenting that investors overwhelmingly hold domestic securities, in spite 
of portfolio theory which suggests international diversification. The authors offered that this 
“under-diversification” is either due to optimism regarding local investment opportunities or risk 
concerns about buying equities abroad. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) expanded on this result and 
found that even within the United States investment managers prefer to invest in companies located 
near their headquarters. They suggest that this bias is driven by an informational advantage rather 
than mere familiarity after finding that the local bias is strongest in small and highly levered firms. 
Consistent with this belief, Malloy (2005) found that US analysts located nearer to the firms they 
covered had more accurate forecasts and a greater impact on stock prices after a forecast revision. 
Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2008) extended this result internationally after examining a sample of 32 
countries and finding that analysts from the same country as the firm they are covering produce more 
accurate forecasts. Both papers suggested that their findings were a result of local analysts possessing 
better information than their non-local counterparts. 
Although the original literature focused on institutional trading, individual investors are 
also locally biased (Zhu, 2002).  Locals have been found to make up a disproportionate 
percentage of trading as evidenced by the reduction in trading volume for local stocks around 
blackouts for local shareholders (Shive 2012).  Specifically, Shive (2012) finds that during blackouts 
(which presumably prevent trading from those affected) companies headquartered in the affected area see 
3-7% lower share turnover and lower price volatility.  This effect is strongest for remote firms and firms 
located in wealthy areas, consistent with local investors comprising a disproportionate number of 
shareholders in local stocks   One of the most surprising results regarding individual investment 
came from Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) who found that households generate 3.2% higher 
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returns on their local investments than on their non-local investments.3  Further, the authors find 
that superior returns are highest among firms not in the S&P 500 and suggest that this is 
evidence of informational asymmetry. 
Beyond the effects of local investment, the literature has examined other phenomenon 
associated with a firm’s geographic proximity to capital. Loughran and Schultz (2005) find that 
firms located in urban regions benefit from greater institutional ownership and liquidity as a 
result of their proximity to financial centers. In debt markets, local bond underwriters will issue 
municipal debt at a lower rate than non-locals due to their access to soft information and 
relationships with potential buyers (Butler 2008). Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) further this 
result and find that local banks issue debt at a lower cost to local borrowers. In equity markets, 
El Ghoul et al. (2013) find that investors located nearer to financial centers benefit from lower 
costs of equity capital. Finally, in acquisitions, firms acquiring local targets were found to have 
higher post-acquisition returns even after controlling for the potential synergies and similarities 
between the two firms (Uysal, Kedia, and Panchapagesan, 2008). 
 
2.1.2 Prices and Future Earnings Literature  
The prices-leading-earnings literature finds that the relation between current prices and future 
earnings improves when the average shareholder has more information about the firm. Because 
current stock prices reflect investor beliefs about future cash flows, stock returns today can predict 
what earnings will be in future periods. Over time, researchers have found that the relationship 
between prices and future earnings has strengthened as investors have become more informed. 
Specifically, Collins, Kothari, and Rayburn (1987) found the initial evidence that larger firms have 
                                                          
3 This result was later found in institutional trading as well, with firms in the highest quintile of local institutional 
ownership demonstrating more positive returns than those in the lowest quintile (Baik, Kang, Kim, 2010).   
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more informative stock prices, with size proxying for the availability of firm information. Later 
research would use more direct tests of information supply, such as Schleicher and Walker 
(1999) who found that greater discussion in the annual report leads to a stronger relationship 
between returns and future earnings. In addition, increased corporate disclosure as measured by 
AIMR ratings “brings the future forward” and improves the returns and earnings relationship 
(Gelb and Zarowin, 2002; Lundholm and Myers, 2002). Ettredge et al. (2005) found that firms 
which previously reported as single-segment had more informative stock prices after SFAS No. 
131 improved disclosure quality and mandated they report as multi-segment entities. More 
recently, Orpurt and Zang (2009) found that direct cash flow disclosures helped investors better 
price future cash flows. Finally, Choi et al. (2011) found that management forecasts help 
improve the informativeness of prices. Specifically, the existence, frequency, and precision of 
management forecasts are all factors which help prices better reflect future firm performance. In 
total, there is substantial evidence examining how improved disclosure can improve the 
relationship between prices and future earnings. 
Yet in addition to corporate disclosure, stock prices can better reflect future performance 
when shareholders are independently more informed. Firms with high institutional ownership 
have more accurate prices with respect to future performance as institutional owners are believed 
to have resources which give them an informational advantage (Jiambalvo et al., 2002). In 
addition, higher analyst coverage improves the information environment and gives investors a 
better understanding of the firms’ financial future, allowing prices to better reflect future 
earnings streams (Ayers and Freeman, 2003). Most recently, Drake et al. (2014) found that the 
presence of short sellers, who are believed to be highly sophisticated traders, helps prices better 
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align with future earnings. They found this to be most true when the information environment is 
weakest and short sellers are best able to exploit their informational advantage. 
 
2.2 Motivation and Hypothesis 
From the results found in prior research, geographic proximity to an investment appears 
to influence capital allocation decisions. Institutional investors are awarding lower costs of 
capital to and are better predicting earnings for nearby firms, presumably because of better 
access to information. Continuing this logic to individual investors, it is believed that even small 
traders are able to benefit from superior information flows as a result of their ability to interact 
with firm stakeholders such as customers, suppliers, employees, and management. Through this 
interaction, small traders may be able to obtain information which allows them to better predict 
future earnings streams and thus profit from an information advantage. This value-relevant 
information is often unavailable to other shareholders rendering local traders as a subset of the 
trading population, much like institutions or short sellers, with superior information on which 
they can trade.   
From the prices leading earnings literature we know that the relationship between current 
prices and future earnings is improved when the average shareholder has more information about 
the firm. This can occur directly through increased corporate disclosure or when the shareholder 
base possesses private, quality information. Since local investors have access to superior 
information, when there are more local investors owning a company’s stock, all else equal the 
shareholder base is better informed. Therefore, the greater the percentage of local investors 
owning a company’s shares, the more information is being priced into a company’s stock. 
should lead to more informed stock prices for firms with high local ownership and a stronger 
relationship between current prices and future earnings. 
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H1: Prices better lead earnings as local ownership increases 
 
3. Data 
3.1  Measuring Local Ownership 
I proxy for local ownership using a measure similar to the RATIO measure established in 
Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2008).  Their paper is centered on the phenomenon of a firm being the 
“only game in town” or being the only firm in a region available to locals for local investment.  
If a firm is the only local investment opportunity, then investors with a local bias are left with 
only one option if they wish to invest in a geographically proximate firm. Conversely, regions 
which are home to multiple companies give local investors many opportunities to invest their 
funds locally and therefore each individual firm demonstrates less local ownership.  Using a 
dataset of 1995 investor holdings, the authors confirm that companies located in regions with 
fewer firms competing for local dollars demonstrate higher local ownership.   
To create this ratio, which I name LO for Local Ownership, I first find the total 
population of each county within the United States.4  Next, I multiply the county populations by 
the county median income per capita to get a measure of the total dollars available for 
investment.  Regions with more money should have a greater effect on local stock prices since 
they have more capital available to them to invest.  In the denominator of LO, I use the market 
value of equity of all stocks headquartered in the county.  This measure differs slightly from 
Hong, Kubik, and Stein (hereafter HKS) who use regional book value of equity rather than 
                                                          
4 I use county level data rather than Metropolitan Statistical Areas because MSAs are required to have at least one 
urbanized area of at least 50,000 inhabitants and therefore omits the country’s most rural areas where the local bias 
effect should be strongest.  Further, I use counties rather than states since cities within states can be hundreds of 
miles apart and it seems dubious to suggest that there is local knowledge acquisition when a firm and its “locals” are 
so distant.  However, results are consistent when I use MSAs and states rather than counties. 
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market value.  I choose market value of equity for two reasons: (1) I believe market value of 
equity is a better measure of the size of a region’s investment opportunities since it is updated 
daily and is not restricted by accounting policies such as historical pricing and conservatism and 
(2) because firms with negative equity can be included in the sample rather than appearing to 
reduce available investment choices.  Nevertheless, results are similar whether market value or 
book value is used as the two measures are correlated at .94.   Finally, I take the natural 
logarithm of the ratio to normalize the distribution.  Higher values of LO indicate fewer firms per 
capita and greater local ownership.5   
::See Table 1:: 
Table 1 shows the average values of LO for counties within each state in the sample.  
Consistent with HKS, local ownership is higher in rural states such as Wyoming or Maine where 
there are few businesses and little competition for local dollars.  Conversely, states home to large 
industries such as finance or oil have low local ownership as evidenced by the values of LO for 
New York (6.46) and Texas (6.24).  This is because these states are home to some of America’s 
largest companies with market capitalizations that overpower the potential effects of local 
investment.  In addition, Table 1 presents the state ranks of LO as compared to HKS’s mean state 
ranking.  The correlation of .88 between the two ranks suggests that both samples are picking up 
similar underlying phenomenon.   
 
3.2 FERC Model 
                                                          
5 Hong, Kubik, and Stein calculate RATIO as the regional book value of equity of all firms divided by regional 
personal income.  I switch the numerator and denominator to ease interpretation and so higher values equal greater 
local ownership 
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In order to test how local investment affects the relationship between prices and future 
earnings, I use the future earnings response coefficient (FERC) model from Lundholm and 
Myers (2002).6  The model assumes current returns are a function of changes in 
contemporaneous earnings and expectations of future earnings.  It tests the strength of the 
relationship between current returns and expected future earnings by regressing returns on 
earnings in the next three years and controlling for past and present earnings and future returns. 
The model is 
𝑅𝑡 =  𝑎1 +  𝑏1𝐼𝐵𝑡−1 +  𝑏2𝐼𝐵 +  𝑏3𝐼𝐵𝑡3 +  𝑏4𝑅𝑡3 +  𝜀𝑡              (1)                                   
where 𝑅𝑡 is the annual stock return for year t, inclusive of dividends, IBt-1  and IBt are the income 
before extraordinary items from fiscal years t-1and t respectively, IBt3 is the sum of income 
before extraordinary items for fiscal year t+1 to t+3, and Rt3 is buy-and-hold return on the stock 
from fiscal years t+1 to t+3, compounded annually.  All earnings variables are scaled by the 
market value of equity at the beginning of fiscal year t. 
The overall goal of the model is to capture how current returns are reflecting information 
contained in future earnings. Since current returns are partially a reflection of changes in 
contemporaneous earnings, the model includes earnings levels in year t-1 and t with the two 
coefficients combining to show the effect of the change in current earnings on returns. In 
addition, current returns incorporate expected future earnings. Since future earnings expectations 
are unknown at time t, realized future earnings are used as a proxy. IBt3 is therefore added to the 
model with the assumption that current returns are inclusive of the earnings which are to be 
realized over the next three years. However, since prices at t can only reflect future earnings 
                                                          
6 This model is an adaptation of the model used in Collins et al. (1994)  
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information which is anticipated at time t, it is necessary to control for the portion of future earnings 
which are realized in periods t+1 to t+3 but were unanticipated in t when prices were set. Otherwise 
IBt3 will include both expected future earnings (which are correlated with current returns) and 
unexpected future earnings (which are uncorrelated with current returns) and the coefficient will be 
bias toward zero as it loses explanatory power for current returns. Rt3 is included in the model to 
capture the portion of earnings which were realized in t+1 to t+3 but were unanticipated at time t.7 
Future returns will be highly correlated with changes in future earnings which were unexpected at 
time t. Therefore, by including Rt3 in the model, it controls for the portion of earnings which are 
unexpected at time t but are realized in t+1 to t+3 and allows IBt3 to only capture the future 
earnings streams which were expected when setting prices in t. 
 Since this paper is testing the effects of local ownership on the relationship between 
current stock prices and future earnings, I set up interaction variables within model (1) to test 
how local ownership modifies the relationship between  𝑅𝑡 and IBt3.  If high local ownership 
means that stock prices contain more information about future earnings at time t, the interaction 
term should have a positive coefficient.  Since prior literature has found other factors which 
explain the relationship between prices and earnings, I include controls to help ensure the tests 
are truly capturing the effects of local ownership.   In full, the model is    
                                                          
7  In a robustness test available in Appendix B I use local inflation levels as a proxy for expected returns since 
expected returns for local stockholders may be different than the expected returns priced by the market as a whole. 
Prior literature has used inflation as a proxy for discount rates (Patatoukas 2015) and therefore by using local 
inflation levels I am able to infer what local expected returns are. Results are similar regardless of the expected 
return proxy used. 
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𝑅𝑡 =  𝑎1 +  𝑏1𝐼𝐵𝑡−1 +  𝑏2𝐼𝐵𝑡 +  𝑏3𝐼𝐵𝑡3 +  𝑏4𝑅𝑡3  +  𝑏5𝐿𝑂𝑡 + 𝑏6𝐿𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝐵𝑡−1 +  𝑏7𝐿𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝐵𝑡
+  𝑏8𝐿𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝐵𝑡3 +  𝑏9𝐿𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡3  + 𝑏10𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝑏11𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐼𝐵𝑡−1
+  𝑏12𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐼𝐵𝑡 +  𝑏13𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐼𝐵𝑡3 +  𝑏14𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑅𝑡3  +  𝑏15𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑡
+  𝑏16𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝐵𝑡−1 +  𝑏17𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝐵𝑡 +  𝑏18𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝐵𝑡3 + 𝑏19 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡3  
+  𝑏20𝑆𝐷𝑡 +  𝑏21𝑆𝐷𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝐵 +  𝑏22𝑆𝐷𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝐵𝑡 + 𝑏23 𝑆𝐷𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝐵𝑡3 +  𝑏24𝑆𝐷𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡3
+ 𝑏25𝐼𝑂𝑡  +  𝑏26𝐼𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝐵𝑡−1 +  𝑏27𝐼𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝐵𝑡 +  𝑏28𝐼𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝐵𝑡3 +  𝑏29𝐼𝑂𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡3
+ 𝑏30𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑡  + 𝑏31𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝐵𝑡−1 +  𝑏32𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝐵𝑡
+  𝑏33𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝐵𝑡3 +  𝑏34𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡3  +  𝑏35𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡 + 𝑏36𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝐵𝑡−1
+  𝑏37𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝐵𝑡 +  𝑏38𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝐵𝑡3 +  𝑏39𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡3 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +  𝜀𝑡                                                                                                  (2) 
where LO is the natural logarithm of the ratio of total county dollars of personal income divided 
by the market value of equity of all firms in the county, MV is the log of the market value of 
equity at the beginning of the fiscal year, LOSS is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm had 
earnings before extraordinary items less than 0, and 0 otherwise, SD is the standard deviation of 
earnings from years t to t+3, IO is the percentage of shares outstanding owned by institutions, 
NUMEST is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts issuing forecasts for the 
firm, MTB is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity, and industry 
controls are two-digit SIC codes.   
MV is included in the model to control for differences in the information environment due 
to size. LOSS is included because of differences in how losses and gains affect prices (Hayn, 
1995). SD is added to the model because firms with less persistent earnings streams are harder to 
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predict at time t and therefore may have prices which poorly reflect future earnings streams. 
Since institutional owners are better informed than individual investors, I include IO to control 
for the amount of information contained in the stock price which is a result of institutional 
investor’s superior information rather than local investors (Jiambalvo et al., 2002). NUMEST is 
added because firms with high analyst followings have better information environments, a result 
of analysts’ superior resources (Ayers and Freeman, 2003). Lastly, MTB is included because 
distressed firms often have more complicated information environments than their profitable 
peers due to restructurings, management changes, or bankruptcies which make predicting 
earnings streams more difficult (Zhang 2006). Finally, in addition to industry and year controls, 
in all tests I cluster standard errors by firm and year. This is done to mitigate the individual 
effects that particular firms, industries, or years may have on the predictability of earnings and 
the earnings-return relationship. 
 
3.3 Sources 
 County-level personal income data is obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ 
(BEA) Regional GDP and Personal Income Database.  This database contains regional personal 
income, population, and per capita median income data for each county in the United States 
dating back to 1969.  For pricing data, I use the Center for Research in Security Prices’ (CRSP) 
daily return file to obtain firm and market-level returns for all available firms.  I use Compustat 
to obtain both firm level accounting information and headquarter information.  To place cities in 
their proper county, I refer to the United States Postal Services Zip Code Database which lists 
each city and ZIP code with the associated county it belongs to.  For estimates of earnings 
expectations and levels of analyst coverage, I use the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System 
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(I/B/E/S).  Lastly, Thompson Reuters Institutional Holdings Summary file is used to obtain data 
regarding the percentage of firm shares outstanding held by major financial institutions.   
 
4. Empirical Results 
::See Table 2:: 
 
Table 2 Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the data used in the sample. The 
median firm in the sample has net income equal to 6% of their market capitalization or 
equivalently a P/E ratio around 16x. Over a three-year window, the total net income earned is 
equal to 18% of the market capitalization from year t-1. Firms also exhibit a median return of 
9%, consistent with the average returns on the stock market. Return and income variables are 
positively skewed, even after winsorizing the data.8    
The average value for county levels of LO is 7.02. Consistent with Table 1, these values 
are highest in rural regions and lowest in major cities such as Atlanta, Cincinnati, Dallas, and 
New York City. Further, values for LO are low in towns where large corporations are 
headquartered but without a large population base such as Bentonville (Wal-Mart) and Cupertino 
(Apple). Institutional owners account for 50% of the shares outstanding and the median firm is 
covered by four analysts. Overall the sample appears to represent an appropriate cross-section of 
publicly traded firms.  
                                                          
8 Because of the potential influence of outliers in unreported tests I truncate rather than winsorize the top 1 and 99%.  
Results are consistent across both treatments of outliers.  In further tests, I truncate the sample by the top and bottom 
10% to see the extent to which my results apply to the general population and find stronger results when the 
“extreme” observations are eliminated from the sample. 
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Panel B presents tests for differences between high and low local ownership firms. Firms 
are split at the median of LO with firms below the median categorized as low local ownership 
firms and those above the median as having high local ownership. The results from this sample 
split indicate that firms with high local ownership are generally smaller and have less 
institutional ownership and analyst coverage. This is consistent with prior literature such as 
Loughran and Schultz (2005) who find that firms located in remote regions of the country attract 
less institutional interest. In addition, firms with large local ownership tend to be more profitable 
as evidenced by their greater present and future earnings streams. Yet despite this improved 
profitability, local ownership appears to play little role in generating greater returns for their 
local firms as there is no statistical difference between high and low local ownership firms with 
regard to contemporaneous or future earnings streams. 
 
::See Table 3:: 
 
Table 3 shows the Pearson and Spearman correlations.  From column (5) is appears that 
firms with high local ownership tend to be smaller, have less institutional ownership, have fewer 
analyst coverage, and have lower market to book ratios.  This is consistent with the theory that 
the lower the market capitalization and the lower the institutional ownership, the easier it is for 
local traders with limited capital to buy large portions in their local companies.  In addition, local 
ownership is positively correlated with future earnings, suggesting that local investors’ 
information advantage allows them to better discern profitable from unprofitable companies and 
therefore buy into companies with high future earnings streams. 
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::See Table 4:: 
 
The results for the tests of H1 appear in Table 4. The first model in Table 4 is the base 
model from Lundholm and Myers (2002) without the inclusion of any controls. Consistent with 
their findings, current returns are negatively correlated with past earnings and future returns, and 
positively correlated with present earnings and future earnings. The consistency between the 
base model and prior literature offers confidence that the model is well specified and suitable for 
examining how local ownership impacts the informativeness of prices.  
The second model in Table 4 is the main test of the effect of local ownership on the 
informativeness of stock prices. The coefficient of interest in Table 4, LO * IBt3, determines 
whether higher local ownership leads to stock prices which have better information regarding 
future cash flows. A positive coefficient on b8 would indicate that the greater the level of local 
ownership, the greater the correlation between prices today and future earning streams. In 
addition, because prices may be better informed due to better future return information rather 
than future cash flow information, b9 (LO * Rett3) tests how the discount rate may be 
influencing the amount of information contained in the stock price. 
The results from model 2, which unlike model 1 include full controls, support H1 and 
suggest that local ownership improves the information contained in prices by generating stock 
prices which better align with future earnings streams.9  The positive and significant coefficient 
on LO * IBt3 of 0.06 indicates that even after controlling for the potentially mitigating effects of 
size and institutional ownership, local owners are able to better price stocks. The positive 
                                                          
9 For brevity, the coefficients on the control variables are not reported in Table 4.  Appendix A reports the full 
models for the second and third models in Table 4.   
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coefficient of 0.06 on LO * IBt3 increases in both magnitude and significance after controlling 
for factors such as size, institutional ownership, and analyst coverage, providing robust evidence 
that locals have access to private information which allows them to more accurately price local 
stocks. In addition, the insignificance on LO * Rett3 confirms that the improved accuracy of local 
stock prices is not due to any improved accuracy in predicting future returns for local investors, 
but is instead attributable to improvements in future cash flow estimation.10  
In order to better understand the economic impact of local ownership, in unreported tests 
I convert LO into a decile rank and re-run Model 2 from Table 4. Because LO is a continuous 
variable in Table 4, it is difficult to interpret what the coefficient of 0.06 means economically. 
By transforming the variable of interest into a rank, I am able to better ascertain what the impact 
of an increase in local ownership means for local firm returns. When LO is calculated as a decile 
rank variable (meaning it ranges from 1 to 10), the coefficient on LO * IBt3 is 0.03 and maintains 
its statistical significance. Interpreted economically, this result suggests that for an average value 
of IBt3 (0.17), a one decile increase in local ownership results in a 0.51% increase in current 
returns (0.03 * 0.17). Taken further, a firm in the greatest decile of LO has current returns which 
are 4.59% higher than those in the lowest decile for equal future earnings streams as a percentage 
of market value of equity.11 Taken together with the prior results, while this paper does not look 
directly at local portfolio returns, it offers strong evidence that locals are able to outperform non-
local investors because they have access to information which is relevant to future earnings. 
                                                          
10 As another test of this result, I substitute future returns for local inflation levels as a predictor of the discount rate 
in Appendix B.  Regardless of the proxy used, the results confirm that it is the prediction of future cash flows that 
drive the improved accuracy of local stock prices. 
11 This is calculated by taking the coefficient of 0.03, multiplying it by the average value of IBt3 of 0.17, and then 
calculating the value for the lowest and highest deciles, which have values of 1 and 10 respectively.  Therefore 
4.59% is calculated from (0.03*0.17*10) – (0.03*0.17*1) which is equal to (0.051 – 0.0051) or 4.59% 
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Model 3 in Table 4 includes county level controls in the main model as a substitute for 
year controls. By doing so, this test controls for any county specific factors that may influence 
the ability of stock prices to reflect information such as permanent risks associated with climate, 
poverty levels, education, or other demographics. Therefore, Model 3 is testing how the 
information in stock prices changes when local ownership within a county has increased, rather 
than testing how local ownership is changing between counties which may have inherently 
different characteristics. Even after the inclusion of county level controls the results continue to 
suggest that as local ownership increases, stock prices are better reflecting future earnings. 
Overall, the results from both models suggest that both between counties and within counties, the 
greater the local ownership the better information contained in the stock price. 
 
5. Robustness  
5.1 The impact of the Internet on Prices and Earnings 
Because the main sample extends from 1985-2011, it is possible that the influence local 
investors have on stock prices has changed as the investing landscape has evolved over the past 
30 years.  In recent years, individual trading has increased with the advent of the internet and 
online trading, allowing for local investors to trade more easily and cheaply than in the past 
(Choi et al. 2000). These online brokerages could increase the amount of local knowledge 
contained in prices as they allow individuals to trade more easily than before and include their 
local knowledge into stock prices when in prior years they may have been unwilling or unable to 
do so. However, the internet has also allowed for information to disseminate more easily than in 
the past, perhaps eliminating the local information advantage as traders from around the world 
can now access local media which was previously only available to traders with a physical 
proximity to the investment. Therefore Table 5 tests how the relationship between prices and 
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earnings has evolved over time and whether the changing technological landscape of the past 30 
years has strengthened or attenuated the local investor effect. 
 
::See Table 5:: 
 
The results from Table 5 suggest that as the internet has become a more commonplace 
feature of everyday life, local investors can more easily act on their private information. The 
coefficient on LO * IBt3 for the regression from 2007-2011 is 2.5 times higher than it is for any 
prior period, suggesting that in the most recent years the influence of local ownership has been 
strongest within the sample. This is consistent with notion that local traders possessed an 
information advantage in prior years but were less able to act upon their information edge because 
the ease of online trading was unavailable, resulting in the reduced correlation between prices today 
and future earnings for earlier decades. In addition, the results do not support the belief that the 
improved dissemination of information through the internet is mitigating the information advantage 
available to investors who are physically proximate to their investments. 
 
5.2 Institutional Owners as Local Investors 
While local ownership appears to be an influencing factor for all time periods in the 
sample, it is possible that for companies in certain regions, the effects are weaker.  The data 
supports that local ownership is highest in rural counties where institutional ownership is least 
prevalent.  Consistent with this notion, in regions where institutional ownership is highest, the 
effects of local ownership should be reduced.  If institutional investors are also physically 
proximate to their investments, then they should benefit from the local information advantage as 
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well.  To test this belief, I split the sample into two groups, New York companies12 and Non-
New York companies, to test whether regions with a high institutional presence are more 
dependent on institutional trading rather than individual trading to drive the information in stock 
prices.  
 
::See Table 6:: 
 
Consistent with the belief that a greater city-wide institutional presence may mitigate the 
effects of local ownership, Table 6 finds that in New York City, the effect of local ownership on 
stock prices is insignificant.  Instead, institutional ownership drives the relationship between 
prices and future earnings while for companies outside of a financial center, locals are still able 
to drive stock prices informativeness.  This is because institutions in New York City have an 
informational edge due to both their sophistication and their physical presence, allowing them to 
dominate local stock prices.  This result suggests that institutional traders are also benefitting 
from a local information advantage and the effects of individual trading are most pronounced in 
regions outside of institutional attention.   
 
5.3 Cost of Living 
Lastly, Table 7 re-runs the main test but on a subsample which includes a control for the 
cost of living in a particular county. Regions with a high cost of living tend to pay higher wages 
and therefore may be more able to control stock market prices as a result of their relatively 
inflated income. Conversely, regions with low relative pay may not have the same resources 
                                                          
12 New York companies here consist of companies located near New York as well including those in Newark, Long 
Island, and Yonkers 
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available to them to influence stock prices and the effects of local ownership may be reduced for 
these regions. Using Wage Index data from the National Bureau of Economic Research from 
1986-2003, I match each county with its Metropolitan Statistical Area and assign the proper 
Wage Index for that county-year.13  I then re-run Model (2) to on this reduced sample, but 
include the Wage Index control.   
 
::See Table 7:: 
 
The results from Table 7 show that even after controlling for the potential influencing 
effects of local cost of living, locals are still able to drive the relationship between prices and 
earnings. However, the Wage Index results suggest that as the cost of living increases, the 
relationship between prices and earnings attenuates. This once again supports the idea that the 
effect of local ownership on prices and future earnings streams is highest in the most rural areas 
of the country, where the cost of living is typically the lowest. Overall, the results from these 
additional tests support that while local investor’s ability to improve the information contained 
in stock prices may vary across locations and time periods, the result is robustness and 
consistently present within the sample. 
 
5.4 Untabulated Analysis 
As further robustness, I run several tests which examine whether my results are consistent 
across different specifications of the main model. First, I examine whether measuring local 
ownership by metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) or states produces similar results to the 
                                                          
13 The Wage Index is a scaling index used to determine the average wage differences for medical professionals in 
MSAs across the country and is a used as an approximation of the general cost of living in each region.   
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original county measurement.  Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2008) measure local ownership at the 
MSA and state levels and find greater local ownership across both groupings.  To ensure that my 
results are not being driven by the decision to use county measurements, I re-run my main model 
with LO measured as the MSA (state) income levels divided by the market capitalization of firms 
in the MSA (state).  Results are consistent regardless of the region classification used, suggesting 
that information flows are available to all persons within a reasonable geographic proximity.  
Additionally, since HKS use book value of equity rather than the market value, I re-run my main 
test with book value as the denominator.  Because of the high correlation between the two 
measurements, results are relatively unchanged. 
Further, while I originally winsorize my data by 1 and 99%, I run supplementary tests to 
examine the extent to which my results apply to the population at large and to confirm they are 
not driven by the extremes of the population. First I truncate rather than winsorize the 1st and 
99th percentiles and find results in line with those reported. I also truncate the sample at the 10th 
and 90th percentile because the summary statistics in Table 2 suggest skewness in the data and 
because I wish to test whether my local ownership results are driven by the most urban or rural 
regions of the country or if they are applicable to investors everywhere. Using this reduced 
sample I find results stronger than those reported with a coefficient on LO * IBt3 of .10 and z-
statistic of 4.11, suggesting that the information advantage I report is available to investors 
throughout the country. Taken together, it appears the reported results are robust across 
different constructions of my main proxy and across sample variations, both lending credence 
to the validity of the main results. 
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6.  Conclusions 
 
Despite a substantial literature which discusses the informational advantages of physical 
proximity to an investment, the accounting literature has yet to explore how this information 
affects the relationship between stock prices and accounting information. This paper documents 
that local shareholders are a set of investors with access to superior price-relevant information 
who assist stock prices in more accurately reflect future firm performance. Much like 
institutional investors, analysts, or short sellers, local investors should be seen as a subset of the 
investing population which can improve stock prices and anticipate future accounting 
information better than the general population. 
 
These results will allow accounting researchers to consider the value of the information 
gleaned by physical proximity and how it can impact the information content contained in future 
corporate disclosure or accounting releases. For example, restatements may be known by local 
investors prior to the official announcement if they are aware of director malfeasance or have 
inside knowledge regarding the veracity of the original numbers. Additionally, earnings 
management may be less fruitful if local investors are better aware of the true financial state of 
the firm and are not misled by financial manipulation techniques. In total, this paper hopes to 
demonstrate that local investors are a substantial part of the investing population who can better 
predict future earnings streams and potentially mitigate the importance of earnings or 
performance disclosures. 
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7. Tables 
 
TABLE 1 
Average LO by State and Comparison to Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2008) 
         State LO LO RANK HKS RANK   State LO LO RANK HKS RANK 
WY 9.99 1 1 
 
WI 7.48 26 25 
NM 9.25 2 4 
 
NC 7.43 27 34 
ME 8.87 3 12 
 
RI 7.40 28 28 
MT 8.87 4 4 
 
CO 7.39 29 34 
HI 8.69 5 - 
 
AL 7.35 30 20 
VT 8.69 6 6 
 
IN 7.34 31 19 
NH 8.69 7 10 
 
ID 7.32 32 26 
SD 8.56 8 6 
 
TN 7.26 33 26 
WV 8.53 9 2 
 
NJ 7.10 34 43 
KS 8.41 10 8 
 
OH 7.08 35 29 
SC 8.38 11 15 
 
WA 7.08 36 37 
FL 8.33 12 10 
 
AR 6.86 37 33 
MS 8.28 13 15 
 
MA 6.83 38 31 
LA 8.03 14 8 
 
CA 6.74 39 31 
ND 8.02 15 2 
 
OK 6.67 40 40 
IA 7.95 16 12 
 
IL 6.66 41 44 
MI 7.90 17 39 
 
MN 6.66 42 24 
KY 7.80 18 14 
 
NY 6.46 43 45 
AZ 7.71 19 17 
 
VA 6.42 44 41 
OR 7.61 20 30 
 
CT 6.30 45 47 
UT 7.59 21 21 
 
TX 6.24 46 42 
MD 7.59 22 17 
 
DE 6.12 47 48 
NV 7.57 23 21 
 
NE 5.81 48 46 
MO 7.57 24 21   GA 5.66 49 38 
PA 7.48 25 34      
LO RANK and HKS RANK Correlation 
      
0.8841*** 
      
Table 1 presents the average values for LO per state in the sample.  LO is measured as the natural logarithm of the county per 
capita median income multiplied by its population and divided by the market value of equity for all firms headquartered in the 
county. LO RANK is the rank of firms with the highest local ownership using LO with 1 indicated the highest local ownership.  
HKS RANK represents the rank of RATIO from Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2008’s) 1970-2005 sample. Hawaii was omitted from 
HKS’s sample.   *** = p-value<0.01  
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 25% 75% 
IBt  0.04 0.06 0.14 0.02 0.09 
IBt3  0.17 0.18 0.41 0.03 0.33 
RETt  0.22 0.09 0.72 -0.17 0.41 
RETt3  0.62 0.23 1.53 -0.21 0.89 
LO  7.02 6.96 1.60 5.88 8.00 
SIZE  6.05 5.90 1.81 4.69 7.20 
LOSS  0.14 0 0.35 0 0 
SD  0.08 0.03 0.14 0.02 0.08 
IO  0.50 0.49 0.27 0.27 0.71 
NUMEST  1.75 1.61 0.79 1.10 2.30 
MTB  2.58 1.75 3.03 1.17 2.80 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the main tests.  The sample runs from 1986-2011.  IB is 
income before extraordinary items scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year.  IBt3 is the sum 
of income before extraordinary items for years t+1 to t+3, scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of fiscal 
year t+1.  RET is the buy-and-hold return measured over the 12-month period beginning at the start of fiscal year t. RETt3 is 
the buy-and-hold return for the three years following the beginning of fiscal year t+1.  LO is the natural logarithm of the 
total county population multiplied by the county median personal income and divided by the sum of the market value of 
equity for all firms headquartered in that county.  SIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. LOSS is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has a report income before extraordinary items less than 0, and 0 otherwise.  SD is 
the standard deviation of earnings from year t to t+3.  IO is the percentage of shares outstanding owned by an institution.  
NUMEST is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts producing annual earnings forecasts for the firm. MTB 
is the market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year divided by the book value of equity. All variables are 
winsorized by year at the 1 and 99% levels.    
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TABLE 3 
Spearman/Pearson Correlation Matrix 
     
  
 
 
     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(1) IBt 
 
0.54 0.36 0.04 0.09 -0.01 -0.42 -0.18 -0.03 0.01 -0.35 
(2) IBt3 0.40  
0.33 0.46 0.07 0.00 -0.28 -0.33 -0.03 0.03 -0.28 
(3) RETt 0.08 0.12 
 
-0.06 0.01 -0.07 -0.03 -0.13 0.05 0.00 -0.28 
(4) RETt3 -0.09 0.28 -0.07 
 
0.01 -0.06 0.04 -0.10 -0.05 -0.02 -0.10 
(5) LO 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.02 
 
-0.35 -0.02 0.05 -0.25 -0.25 -0.18 
(6) SIZE 0.09 0.01 -0.15 -0.15 -0.37 
 
-0.23 -0.36 0.59 0.73 0.38 
(7) LOSS -0.42 -0.27 0.06 0.11 -0.01 -0.23 
 
0.41 -0.08 -0.12 0.08 
(8) SD -0.37 -0.33 -0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.21 0.22 
 
-0.13 -0.22 -0.26 
(9) IO 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.10 -0.25 0.55 -0.13 -0.06 
 
0.49 0.14 
(10) NUMEST 0.06 0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.26 0.71 -0.16 -0.13 0.36 
 
0.26 
(11) MTB -0.13 -0.14 -0.16 0.00 -0.15 0.23 0.13 -0.05 0.05 0.13   
 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix for the variables used in the main tests.  Pearson correlations are below the diagonal and Spearman correlations are above.  The 
sample runs from 1986-2011.  IB is income before extraordinary items scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year.  IBt3 is the sum of income 
before extraordinary items for years t+1 to t+3, scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of fiscal year t+1.  RET is the buy-and-hold return measured over the 
12-month period beginning at the start of fiscal year t. RETt3 is the buy-and-hold return for the three years following beginning of fiscal year t+1.  LO is the natural 
logarithm of the total county population multiplied by the median county income per capita divided by the sum of the market value of equity for all firms headquartered in 
that county.  SIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. LOSS is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has a report income before extraordinary items 
less than 0, and 0 otherwise.  SD is the standard deviation of earnings from year t to t+3.  IO is the percentage of shares outstanding owned by an institution.  NUMEST is 
the number of analysts producing annual earnings forecasts for the firm. MTB is the market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year divided by the book value of 
equity. All variables are winsorized by year at the 1 and 99% levels.    
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TABLE 4 
Regressions of Prices and Earnings and Local Ownership 
       Dependent Variable: RETt 
Independent Variables   Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
       IBt-1 
 
-1.01*** 
 
-0.73* 
 
-0.95** 
  
(-6.80) 
 
(-1.77) 
 
(-2.22) 
       IBt 
 
0.74*** 
 
1.34*** 
 
1.30*** 
  
(2.62) 
 
(5.89) 
 
(4.37) 
       IBt3 
 
0.25*** 
 
-0.53** 
 
-0.56*** 
  
(4.01) 
 
(-2.55) 
 
(-2.64) 
       RETt3 
 
-0.06*** 
 
-0.01 
 
0.01 
  
(-4.98) 
 
(-0.37) 
 
(0.54) 
       LO 
 
 
 
-0.03*** 
 
-0.02 
  
 
 
(-4.57) 
 
(-0.99) 
       LO * IBt-1 
 
 
 
-0.02 
 
0.01 
  
 
 
(-0.79) 
 
(0.37) 
       LO * IBt 
 
 
 
0.09** 
 
0.08*** 
  
 
 
(2.40) 
 
(2.65) 
       LO * IBt3 
 
 
 
0.06*** 
 
0.06*** 
  
 
 
(3.63) 
 
(4.36) 
       LO * RETt3 
 
 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.00 
  
 
 
(-0.24) 
 
(-1.05) 
       CONTROLS 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
YES 
  
 
 
 
 
 
County Fixed Effects  NO  NO  YES 
       
Intercept 
 
0.21*** 
 
0.67*** 
 
0.25 
  
(4.88) 
 
(6.11) 
 
(1.54) 
       
       Number of Obs. 
 
42,342 
 
42,342 
 
42,342 
       Adjusted R2   8.62%   26.75%   23.38% 
Table 4 shows the results for regressions of returns on lagged, current, and future earnings and future returns 
interacted with LO and controls.  The controls, whose coefficients are not reported for brevity, include SIZE, 
LOSS, SD, IO, NUMEST, and MTB, each interacted with lagged, current, and future earnings, and future 
returns, and year and 2-digit SICs.  Model 1 shows the base model from Lundholm and Myers (2002) without 
any controls.  Model 2 includes the full model with all controls.  Model 3 includes the full model with county 
fixed effects instead of year fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered by firm and year.  All variables are 
winsorized at the 1 and 99% levels.  * p-value <=0.10, ** p-value <=.05, *** p-value <=.01.  t-statistics are 
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below the coefficients in parentheses and italics.  Variables are defined in Table 2.  A version of Table 4 with 
all values reported is available in Appendix A. 
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TABLE 5 
Changes in the Price to Earnings and Local Ownership Relationship Over Time 
         Dependent Variable: RETt 
Independent 
Variables 
  1986-1995   1996-2000   2001-2006   2007-2011 
  
     
 
 
IBt-1 
 
-0.91** 
 
-2.07*** 
 
-1.03 
 
-0.83*** 
  
(-2.59) 
 
(-4.64) 
 
(-1.04) 
 
(-6.78) 
         IBt 
 
1.98*** 
 
4.73*** 
 
0.50** 
 
0.81** 
  
(3.15) 
 
(6.36) 
 
(2.14) 
 
(2.42) 
         IBt3 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.62** 
 
-0.10 
 
-1.16*** 
  
(-0.11) 
 
(-2.09) 
 
(-0.28) 
 
(-4.13) 
         RETt3 
 
-0.07* 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.01 
 
0.06 
  
(-1.80) 
 
(-0.80) 
 
(-0.45) 
 
(1.11) 
         LO 
 
-0.01* 
 
-0.05*** 
 
-0.03*** 
 
-0.03*** 
  
(-1.78) 
 
(-4.46) 
 
(-3.38) 
 
(-3.21) 
         LO * IBt-1 
 
-0.03 
 
0.01 
 
-0.02 
 
0.02 
  
(-1.02) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(-0.26) 
 
(1.26) 
         LO * IBt 
 
0.07 
 
0.19*** 
 
0.11*** 
 
-0.01 
  
(0.95) 
 
(2.87) 
 
(2.85) 
 
(-0.18) 
         LO * IBt3 
 
0.03** 
 
0.04*** 
 
0.02 
 
0.10*** 
  
(2.15) 
 
(2.79) 
 
(1.63) 
 
(4.23) 
         LO * RETt3 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
-0.02* 
  
(0.15) 
 
(0.39) 
 
(0.37) 
 
(1.83) 
         CONTROLS 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept 
 
0.62*** 
 
0.61*** 
 
0.99*** 
 
0.80*** 
  
(6.34) 
 
(2.90) 
 
(6.98) 
 
(5.00) 
         Number of Obs. 
 
13,193 
 
9,427 
 
11,514 
 
8,212 
Adjusted R2   29.45%   24.36%   32.34%   45.39% 
Table 5 shows the results for regressions of returns on lagged, current, and future earnings and future returns 
interacted with LO and controls.  The controls, whose coefficients are not reported for brevity, include SIZE, LOSS, 
SD, IO, NUMEST, and MTB, each interacted with lagged, current, and future earnings, and future returns, and year 
and 2-digit SICs.  The sample is split into different time periods, each representing approximately one-quarter of the 
total sample. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year.  All variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99% levels.  * 
p-value <=0.10, ** p-value <=.05, *** p-value <=.01.  t-statistics are below the coefficients in parentheses and 
italics.  Variables are defined in Table 2 
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TABLE 6 
Institutional Ownership and Price to Earnings for New York 
and Non-New York Firms 
Dependent Variable: RETt 
Independent 
Variables 
  
New York 
Companies 
    
Non-New 
York 
Companies 
  
  
    
 IBt-1 
 
-1.56** 
  
-0.98* 
 
  
(-2.04) 
  
(-1.88) 
 
       IBt 
 
1.35 
  
1.46*** 
 
  
(0.97) 
  
(4.38) 
 
       IBt3 
 
-0.43 
  
-0.58** 
 
  
(-0.75) 
  
(-2.49) 
 
       RETt3 
 
-0.05 
  
-0.01 
 
  
(-0.55) 
  
(-0.21) 
 
       LO 
 
-0.07*** 
  
-0.03*** 
 
  
(-3.25) 
  
(-4.56) 
 
       LO * IBt-1 
 
0.10 
  
0.01 
 
  
(0.98) 
  
(0.16) 
 
       LO * IBt 
 
0.21 
  
0.06** 
 
  
(0.99) 
  
(1.96) 
 
       LO * IBt3 
 
0.07 
  
0.07*** 
 
  
(0.82) 
  
(3.37) 
 
       LO * RETt3 
 
0.00 
  
-0.00 
 
  
(0.09) 
  
(-0.43) 
 
       IO 
 
-0.03 
  
0.19*** 
 
  
(-0.30) 
  
(3.26) 
 
       IO * IBt-1 
 
-0.33 
  
-0.26 
 
  
(-0.61) 
  
(-0.62) 
 
       IO * IBt 
 
0.95*** 
  
0.02 
 
  
(2.89) 
  
(0.05) 
 
       IO * IBt3 
 
0.49** 
  
0.22 
 
  
(2.13) 
  
(1.32) 
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IO * RETt3 
 
0.01 
  
-0.04 
 
  
(0.20) 
  
(-1.53) 
 
       CONTROLS 
 
YES 
  
YES 
 
  
 
  
 
 Intercept 
 
0.87*** 
  
0.69*** 
 
  
(3.43) 
  
(8.94) 
 
       Number of Obs. 
 
1,799 
  
40,547 
 
       Adjusted R2   34.85%     26.73% 
 Table 6 shows the results for regressions of returns on lagged, current, and future 
earnings and future returns interacted with LO, IO, and controls.  The controls, 
whose coefficients are not reported for brevity, include SIZE, LOSS, SD, NUMEST, 
and MTB, each interacted with lagged, current, and future earnings, and future 
returns, and year and 2-digit SICs.  The first column is a sample of firms 
headquartered in New York City, Yonkers, White Plains, or Newark.  The second 
column is a sample of firms not headquartered in one of those cities.  Standard 
errors are clustered by firm and year.  All variables are winsorized at the 1 and 
99% levels.  * p-value <=0.10, ** p-value <=.05, *** p-value <=.01.  t-statistics 
are below the coefficients in parentheses and italics.  Variables are defined in Table 
2. 
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TABLE 7 
Regressions of Prices and Earnings, Local Ownership, and Cost of 
Living 
Dependent Variable: RETt 
Independent Variables   Full Model with Wage Index 
IBt-1 
 
0.04 
  
(0.11) 
   IBt 
 
0.81 
  
(0.76) 
   IBt3 
 
0.21 
  
(0.76) 
   RETt3 
 
-0.01 
  
(-0.15) 
   LO 
 
-0.03*** 
  
(-2.82) 
   LO * IBt-1 
 
-0.06 
  
(-1.43) 
   LO * IBt 
 
0.14*** 
  
(4.10) 
   LO * IBt3 
 
0.04** 
  
(2.22) 
   LO * RETt3 
 
0.00 
  
(0.59) 
   WI 
 
0.39*** 
  
(3.44) 
   WI * IBt-1 
 
-1.01 
  
(-1.35) 
   WI * IBt 
 
0.34 
  
(0.42) 
   WI * IBt3 
 
-0.48* 
  
(-1.72) 
   WI * RETt3 
 
-0.03 
  
(-0.70) 
   CONTROLS 
 
YES 
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Intercept 
 
0.22 
  
(1.21) 
   Number of Obs. 
 
25,070 
   Adjusted R2   23.49% 
Table 7 shows the results for regressions of returns on lagged, current, and future earnings and 
future returns interacted with LO and controls.  The controls, whose coefficients are not 
reported for brevity, include WI, SIZE, LOSS, SD, IO, NUMEST, and MTB, each interacted 
with lagged, current, and future earnings, and future returns, and year and 2-digit SICs.  WI is 
the wage index from the National Bureau of Economic Research from 1986-2003.  All other 
variables are defined in Table 2.  Standard errors are clustered by firm and year.  All variables 
are winsorized at the 1 and 99% levels.  * p-value <=0.10, ** p-value <=.05, *** p-value 
<=.01.  t-statistics are below the coefficients in parentheses and italics.   
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8. Appendices 
Appendix A 
Regressions of Prices and Earnings and Local Ownership 
     Dependent Variable: RETt 
Independent 
Variables 
  Full Model   
Full Model with 
County Fixed 
Effects 
 
  
 
 
IBt-1 
 
-0.73* 
 
-0.95** 
  
(-1.77) 
 
(-2.22) 
     IBt 
 
1.34*** 
 
1.30*** 
  
(5.89) 
 
(4.37) 
     IBt3 
 
-0.53** 
 
-0.56*** 
  
(-2.55) 
 
(-2.64) 
     RETt3 
 
-0.01 
 
0.01 
  
(-0.37) 
 
(0.54) 
     LO 
 
-0.03*** 
 
-0.02 
  
(-4.57) 
 
(-0.99) 
     LO * IBt-1 
 
-0.02 
 
0.01 
  
(-0.79) 
 
(0.37) 
     LO * IBt 
 
0.09** 
 
0.08*** 
  
(2.40) 
 
(2.65) 
     LO * IBt3 
 
0.06*** 
 
0.06*** 
  
(3.63) 
 
(4.36) 
     LO * RETt3 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.00 
  
(-0.24) 
 
(-1.05) 
     SIZE 
 
-0.13*** 
 
-0.12*** 
  
(-7.41) 
 
(-7.16) 
     SIZE * IBt-1 
 
0.06*** 
 
0.02 
  
(2.61) 
 
(0.99) 
     
     SIZE * IBt 
 
0.04 
 
0.09* 
  
(0.55) 
 
(1.71) 
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     SIZE * IBt3 
 
0.06** 
 
0.08*** 
  
(2.46) 
 
(2.75) 
     SIZE * RETt3 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.01** 
  
(-1.54) 
 
(-2.10) 
     LOSS 
 
0.06** 
 
0.07*** 
  
(2.42) 
 
(2.58) 
     LOSS * IBt-1 
 
0.04 
 
0.03 
  
(0.55) 
 
(0.63) 
     LOSS * IBt 
 
-1.24*** 
 
-1.28*** 
  
(-4.50) 
 
(-4.57) 
     LOSS * IBt3 
 
-0.21*** 
 
-0.22*** 
  
(-3.97) 
 
(-4.18) 
     LOSS * RETt3 
 
0.00 
 
0.01 
  
(0.83) 
 
(1.47) 
     SD 
 
-0.20 
 
-0.24 
  
(-1.47) 
 
(-1.63) 
     SD * IBt-1 
 
0.10 
 
0.01 
  
(0.38) 
 
(0.03) 
     SD * IBt 
 
-0.82*** 
 
-0.75*** 
  
(-2.80) 
 
(-2.76) 
     SD * IBt3 
 
-0.35** 
 
-0.47** 
  
(-2.04) 
 
(-2.44) 
     SD * RETt3 
 
-0.11*** 
 
-0.12*** 
  
(-2.75) 
 
(-3.58) 
     IO 
 
0.18*** 
 
0.23*** 
  
(3.25) 
 
(3.22) 
     IO * IBt-1 
 
-0.18 
 
-0.03 
  
(-0.42) 
 
(-0.07) 
     IO * IBt 
 
0.02 
 
0.07 
  
(0.06) 
 
(0.13) 
     IO * IBt3 
 
0.22 
 
0.20 
37 
 
 
  
(1.41) 
 
(1.57) 
    
 
 
IO * RETt3 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.04 
  
(-1.54) 
 
(-1.49) 
     NUMEST 
 
0.12*** 
 
0.08*** 
  
(4.50) 
 
(3.00) 
     NUMEST * IBt-1 0.01 
 
0.01 
  
(0.09) 
 
(0.11) 
     NUMEST * IBt 
 
-0.05 
 
-0.13 
  
(-0.54) 
 
(-1.44) 
     NUMEST * IBt3 0.12*** 
 
0.10*** 
  
(3.49) 
 
(2.67) 
     NUMEST * RETt3 -0.01 
 
-0.01* 
  
(-1.62) 
 
(-1.69) 
     MTB 
 
-0.02*** 
 
-0.03*** 
  
(-8.24) 
 
(-8.05) 
     MTB * IBt-1 
 
0.02 
 
0.02 
  
(0.58) 
 
(0.47) 
     MTB * IBt 
 
0.03 
 
0.03 
  
(0.42) 
 
(0.88) 
     MTB * IBt3 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.04 
  
(-1.27) 
 
(-1.46) 
     MTB * RETt3 
 
0.01*** 
 
0.01*** 
  
(4.76) 
 
(4.48) 
     Intercept 
 
0.67*** 
 
0.25 
  
(6.11) 
 
(1.54) 
     Number of Obs. 
 
42,342 
 
42,342 
Adjusted R2   26.75%   23.38% 
Appendix A shows the results for regressions of returns on lagged, current, and future 
earnings and future returns interacted with LO, SIZE, LOSS, SD, IO, NUMEST, and MTB, as 
well as year and 2-digit SICs.   The model with county controls includes county fixed 
effects rather than year fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered by firm and year.  All 
variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99% levels.  * p-value <=0.10, ** p-value <=.05, *** 
p-value <=.01.  t-statistics are below the coefficients in parentheses and italics.  Variables 
are defined in Table 2. 
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Appendix B 
 Regressions of Prices and Earnings and Local 
Ownership Using Inflation  
Dependent Variable: RETt 
Independent Variables   
Full Model with 
Inflation 
   IBt-1 
 
-0.86** 
  
(-2.03) 
   IBt 
 
0.60*** 
  
(3.88) 
   IBt3 
 
-0.44 
  
(-1.56) 
   Inflationt 
 
-0.01 
  
(-1.39) 
   LO 
 
0.03 
  
(0.67) 
   LO * IBt-1 
 
0.01 
  
(0.41) 
   LO * IBt 
 
0.07** 
  
(2.03) 
   LO * IBt3 
 
0.03** 
  
(2.03) 
   LO *Inflationt 
 
-0.00 
  
(-1.28) 
   CONTROLS 
 
YES 
   Intercept 
 
2.04** 
  
(2.10) 
   Number of Obs. 
 
19,083 
   Adjusted R2   34.47% 
Appendix A shows the results for regressions of returns on lagged, 
current, and future earnings and MSA level inflation interacted with LO, 
SIZE, LOSS, SD, IO, NUMEST, and MTB, as well as year and 2-digit 
SICs.  The sample runs from 2000-2011. Standard errors are clustered 
by firm and year.  All variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99% levels.  
* p-value <=0.10, ** p-value <=.05, *** p-value <=.01.  t-statistics are 
below the coefficients in parentheses and italics.  Variables are defined 
in Table 2. 
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